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Abstract
A stylized three-region world model for the soybean complex is developed to evaluate the welfare effects of
Roundup Ready (RR) soybean adoption. The innovation is modeled in a structural way that explicitly
accounts for the incentives open to farmers as well as for the pricing of RR soybean seeds by a multinational
firm thatholds intellectual property rights. Themodel, calibrated on recent benchmark data, is solved for
various scenarios to evaluate the production, price, and welf2U"e impacts of RR soybean adoption. The
United States gains substantially from the superior innovation, with the innovator capturing the larger share of
the welfare gains. US farmers benefit in the base scenario, but would be adversely affected if the RR innovation
were to increase yields. Spillover of the new technology to foreign competitors erodes the competitive
position of domestic soybean producers, and export of the technology per se may not improve the welfare
position of the innovating country. With strong overseas intellectual property rights protection, the innovator-
monopolist could extract a substantial share of the efficiency gains, thus benefiting the home country. But
with weaker international intellectual property protection, profits from foreign sales of the new technology
just offset the loss of domestic producer welfare. Consumers in every region gain from the adoption of RR
soybeans.
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Abstract
Astylized three-region world model for the soybean complex is developed to evaluate the welfare effects
ofRoundup Ready (RR) soybean adoption. The innovation is modeled in a structural way that explicitly
accounts for the incentives open to farmers as well as for the pricing of RR soybean seeds by a
multinational firm thatholds intellectual property rights. Themodel, calibrated on recent benchmark data,
is solved for various scenarios to evaluate the production, price, and welf2U"e impacts of RR soybean
adoption. The United States gains substantially from the superior innovation, with the innovator capturing
the larger share of the welfare gains. US farmers benefit in the base scenario, but would be adversely
affected if the RR innovation were to increase yields. Spillover of the new technology to foreign
competitors erodes the competitive position of domestic soybean producers, and export of the technology
per semaynot improve the welfare position of the innovating country. With strong overseas intellectual
property rights protection, the innovator-monopolist could extract a substantial share of the efficiency
gains, thus benefiting the home country. But with weaker international intellectual property protection,
profits from foreign sales of the new technology just offset the loss of domestic producer welfare.
Consumers in every region gain from the adoption of RR soybeans.
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Introduction
Rapid increases in productivity have been adistinctive feature ofagriculture throughout the twentieth
century. Such productivity gains have been sustained by significant public and private investments in
agricultural research and development (R&D) and have led to a number ofimportant consequences,
including declining real food prices and declining employment in agricultural production. Economic
issues related to agricultural R&D and productivity have been the object ofextensive research [Huffman
and Evenson (1993); Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995); Fugiie etal., (1996)]. Anumber ofsignificant
developments in the agricultural sector within the past decade, however, warrant new and increased
research efforts in this area. In particular, the dawn ofbiotechnology is bringing to agriculture a new
generation ofinnovations, such as transgenic crops, that have the potential todramatically change the
agri-food system. Adistinctive feature ofthese innovations is that they are produced mostly from R&D
efforts undertaken bythe private sector, and they are typically protected by intellectual property rights
(IPRs), such aspatents (Rausser, Scotchmer and Simon, 1999). In developed countries IPRs give
monopoly rights to the discoverer, with some limitation (Besen and Raskind, 1991). The exploitation of
this institutionalized market power by innovators carries considerable implications for evaluating the
welfare impact ofagricultural innovations. Moschini and Lapan (1997) point out that the paradigm used
by the vast majority ofprevious agricultural economic studies does not apply any longer, and illustrate the
qualitative welfare implications ofaccounting for IPRs in the context of a closed economy.
The purpose ofthis paper istoextend the line of inquiry suggested by Moschini and Lapan (1997)
to an open economy, and to apply the model to a specific case study. With the effective economies of
scale that come about through technological improvements due toR&D, open access to world markets is
increasingly important for maintaining the health and competitiveness ofthe US agricultural sector. Of
particular significance in this setting are technological "spillovers" across national boundaries. This
phenomenon has been documented extensively by recent research (e.g., Coe and Helpman, 1995; Park,
1995; Eaton and Kortum, 1999). The relevance ofinternational spillovers ofagricultural innovations is
increased by the onset ofbiotechnology for two reasonsi.First, biotechnology innovations may be adapted
todifferent environmbrits much faster than traditional-agronomic innovations, forwhich.-locatipn-:.
specificity typically plays an important role (e.g;,-Maredia, Ward, and Byerleei.1996). Second, as ^
discussed earlier, biotechnology innovationsiare typically produced bymultinational firms that are ideally
positioned-for worldwide'marketing ofsuch; innovations... Insthis context, arelevant question to be .
addressed is how exports'ofUS technologyiaffect US'agricultural producers and US >velfare. Sales by US
multinationals ofthe latest technologyto countries that export competitive.products increases profitability
forthese firms, butundermines UScompetitiveness in exports of the.final product. Though private gains
may, accrue tomultinationals from:these sales,'theiimpact on US welfare may beambiguous as, prices of
US exports decline and market share may be lost.
This ambiguity is related to Bhagwati's (1958) possibility of "immiserizing growth": under
conditioris'of perfect competition and free trade, innovations in one country, while increasing world
•efficiency, may impoverish thatcountry. .However,nn thepresence of an^appropriate-trade, policy, the
growth mustbewelfare-enhancing for the country experiencing the innovation .(Bhagwati, 1968),
Furthermore, explicit consideration of the<relevant industrystructure.is necessary here; If the export
industry is monopolistic, as seems likelywhen.dealing with proprietary innovations,"then the role.for
policy-is much differentthan in the.standard competitive paradigm,-as articulated in the copious.literature
that has developed from Brander and Spencer's (1985) seminal article. While the early analysis of
strategic trade policy towards exports focused on situations in which.the'links between markets were
ignored^'more recent papers^have explored the implications of exports of intermediate products in
vertically related markets [e.g., Spencer andJones (,1991v 1992)]..'Unlike these-papers, where limperfect
competition prevails in both the'intermediate and final product markets, the model that we develop here
assumes imperfect competition for the industry supplyingtthe innovations (because ofIPRs)i;but
postulates that the industry that purchases;the innovated intermediate'inputs (i.e., the farm sector) is
competitive. ' " •, , u-• - ; " !_• ' ,
' Themethodological framework developed to analyze these questions is.applied to the specific
caseof a recent success story in agricultural biotechnology innovation: Roundup Ready(RR)soybeans.
RR soybeans, developed inthe United States byMonsanto, aretoler^t to a particular herbicide and allow
fanners to cut costsby saving on less effective herbicides. Monsanto is marketing this innovation at a
stiffprice premium relative to traditional soybean varieties. Still, at current prices it appears thatthis
innovation is superior to existing alternatives fora variety of farming conditions. Monsanto is actively
attempting to market this innovation worldwide, and adoption rates have been climbing rapidly both in the
United States and in South America (the othermain soybean-growing region). Thus, the case of RR
soybeans provides, inmanyrespects, an ideal illustration of the central issuesanalyzed in this paper.
Roundup® and Roundup Ready® Soybeans
Roundup is the commercial name given byMonsanto to glyphosate, a herbicide discovered by
Monsanto's Dr. John Franz in 1970. Glyphosate is an extraordinarily effective post-emergenceherbicide
that kills virtually all plants. Because of this non-selective feature, it was first marketed for weed control
in roadsideand in tree plantations. The spread of conservation tillage in the United States added a new
dimension to the demand for Roundup, which can be used instead of plowing to remove weeds before
seeding. It seems thatRoundup alsohas favourable toxicological properties, breaking up quickly (once in
the ground) into naturally occurring compounds.
Interest in agricultural use of Roundup has increased dramatically since the developmentof RR
soybeans. Roundup works by inhibiting enolpyruvylshikimate-phosphate synthase (EPSPS), an enzyme
crucial to the synthesis of some amiho acids. Monsanto researchers found that a similar enzyme that
occurs in a strain of agrobacterium (strain CP4) is notaffected byRoundup. Thegene responsible for this
enzyme canbe introduced into thegenome of crops byat least twotransformation methods (thegene gun
was used for RRsoybeans). The resulting transgenic plantthen produces two versions of the enzyme,
EPSPS and CP4-EPSPS. The latter allows the plant to carry on its metabolic functions even in the
presence ofRoundup herbicide.. RR.soybeans, so engineered, were first conimercialized.in the United
States in 1996 and, together with Bt,com,,have become the first highly successfiil transgenic field crop.
RR soybeans allow oyer-rthe-top (post-emergence) applications ofRoundup. This affords farmers avery
effective weed control product thathas a very broad spectrum of control. Furthermore, theRR
technology gives fanners awide window ofintervention, making weed control less dependent on weather
conditions. The RR technology iseffective in all tillage systems, and leaves essentially no herbicide
carryoverthat might interferewith crop rotation.
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From a farmer's economic perspective, use ofRRsoybeans hasthepotential of cutting production
costs, relative to standard varieties, because (atcurrent prices) theRR.technology involves lower .
herbicide expenses. Two other elements affect farmers' returns. First, the RR technology currently
entails higher seed costs.' In the United;States, Monsanto's RR soybe^s are marketed bya number of
companies,(under license). .The m^^keting agreement for^seUing these seeds requires farmers to pay a
sizable "technology fee," currently set at $ 6.50/bag (this amount represents about 40%of the price of
standard soybean seed), and to agreeto restrictive contractual terms (for instance, farmerscan use the
seedonly for planting, cannotresell it, andcannot use harvested beans as seeds for liextyear's crop).
Second, the RR'technology may affect'yield (as will be discussed later, it is not clear in what direction).
Modeling the IhDovation • 'i" . . . ' . ' it • •
The model that we develop envisions a monopolist who markets the proprietary innovation (RR soybeans)
to a large number of competitive farmers, both in the home country and abroad. iThere are a number of
alternative ways ofmodeling the impact of an innovation on the agricultural production function. The
one-factor-augmentation model used by Moschini and Lapan (1997) is perhaps the easiest one for the
purpose of making the qualitative analysis on evaluating the size and distribution ofwelfare gains flowing
from the innovation. But given our applied objectives here, a model that is closer to the actual working of
the RR soybean innovation is desirable.
In any one country the total supply ofsoybeans is written = L-y, where Yg is total
production, L is land allocated to soybeans, and y denotes yield (production per hectare). Production
per hectare depends on the use ofseeds x and ofall other inputs z. It isassumed that the per-hectare
production function /(z^x) requires aconstant optimal density ofseeds S (amount ofseed per unit of
land), irrespective ofthe use ofother inputs, for all likely levels of input and output prices. Hence, the
variableprofit function (per hectare), definedas:
=rnax{p^/(z,x) - r -z - wx}
. .
is written in the additive form:
where Pg is the price ofsoybeans, r is the price vector ofall inputs (excluding land and seed), and w is
the price ofsoybean seed. These assumptions imply that the (optimal) yield function does notdepend on
the price of seed:
d7t{pg,r,w) d7c(pg,r) _ _
9Pb Sps ,
Landdevoted to soybean is the result of an optimal land allocation problem that depends on net
returns (profit perhectare) of soybean and ofother competing crops, aswell as thetotal availability of
land. If all other unit profits (and total land) are treated as constant theycan be subsumed in the
functional representation:
L= L{7v)
Thus, total supply of soybeans is written as:
Yg = L{?r(pg,r)-Sw)-y(ps,r)
and total demand for soybean seed x[pi,r,w) is written as;
x(Pb =L{n{pB ,r)-dw)-5
The new technology is embedded In theseed. By assumption'the amount ofseed used.per hectare
is constant^ but the new technology,is assumed superior such that, at all relevant input price levels ^(and
excluding seed price), the profit per hectare is increased. That is, ifthe subscripted. 1denotes Ae new
technology, then: - " * • =• . i. . •
' •' " ' '•
The innbvator-mohopoiist's problem isto select the price Wj tocharge for the new seed, given
that the alternative (standard) seed isavailalile at price iv (we'assume that theseedofstandard soybean
varieties is competitively supplied.) Let the suliscript z (f =1,2,..., ) denote counties', such that in
each country the monopolist is facing a seed demand function • If the innovative seed is




rMThe objective of themonopolist is to maximize IT subject to a number of constraints. Specifically, the
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monopolist's choice of input prices is constrained bythepresence of the alternative technology (i.e.,
traditional soybean varieties), such that the incentive compatibility constraint for the farmers' adoption
• ' .. .1 , . ,(), J -• - J-,[ • • t-.l . ..
decision requires:
r -
j (Paj (Pbj >'•/)-
Byassumption, the demand for the innovative.seed is proportional to the number of acres of land
planted with this seed. Thus, the demand curve for seed must also incorporate equilibrium in the land
market and in the final product (soybean)market.' To illustrate how this demand curve is.derived,
,'h'! I > ' ;*!' . , -J M jf; • .'Vfi j/ '! ' ^ ' I a !
consider what happens if the price of the seed (wjis set sufficiently low that the presence of the
•'.'i ' • • " • ('•II .Ji; 0; '
alternative technology is irrelevant and all soybean acreage is allocated to the new seed. Of course, such a
low price is unlikely to be,profit maximizing for theiinnpyatpr-monopplist.^ But as^emonopolist,
. I-'
increases the price of seed, this lowers the rent earned on land, reduces land planted in soybeans, reduces
output, and thus increases soybean prices. ^ As soybean prices increase, the land rents that could be
earned using the older technology also increase. Ata sufficiently high price for the innovative seed, the
threat of theoldertechnology constrains themonopolist's pricing decision the incentive
compatibility constraint binds). Further increases in the price ofthe innovative seed lead to the diversion
of landfrom the newer technology to the oldertechnology {i.e., adoption is incomplete). Thus, the
demandcurve for the innovativeseedmust incorporate the equilibriumconditions in other markets (e.g.,
the land and soybean markets), as well as the incentive compatibility constraint.
Given this demandfor seed, the monopolistchoosesthe profit-maximizingprice. If, at the
unconstrained monopoly solution, the incentive compatibility constraint does not bind, the innovation is
drastic; otherwise, the innovation is nondrastic andthe presence of the alternative technology constrains
the monopolist's optimal pricing decision, as explained in Moschini and Lapan (1997).2 Note that the
innovation can affect soybean supply, and hence soybean price, through two distinct avenues: by
changing the amount of land allocated to soybean production and by changing average yield peracre.
Because yields per acrewill in general differ between the old and newtechnologies, changes in the
adoption rate (foranygiven amount of land allocated to soybeans) will change equilibrium soybean
prices, and hence the price the monopolist can charge for RR seed.3 Let equilibrium prices ofsoybeans
bedenotedby where w, = w'l.pw'i 2,...,Wjis the vector ofA*" innovated input prices
(one foreach of theproducing countries). Then the monopolist's problem can be rewritten as:
^ Thedemand forother inputs, besides land, changes as theseed price increases, and these input prices
also could change. Tosimplify, we assume these prices aregiven and focus on the endogeneity of land
and soybean prices.
2 The notions of drastic and nondrastic innovationswere introduced by Arrow (1962).
3 Inthe present model, therefore, it ispossible tohave a "supply response" due to the innovation even
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Inwhat follows we,will not characterize the optimality conditions for this problem,^ We will instead rely
on observed pricing behavior by the monopolist tocarry ojit ,our welfare |Calculations. ,
We should note atAisppint,that in.this model,Ae innovatorrmqnppplist could chpose to.price the
innovation such that adoption iscomplete., In reality, it is common toobserve that a superior innovation is
not adopted immediately, and that new and obsolete technologies.may coexist at any giyen point intime.
This is known as theprocess of "diffusion" in the literature ontechnology adoption (Karshenas and
Stoneman, 1995). Heterogeneity among users, .uncertainty, and information considerations are among the
explanations that haye beenoffered to explain thetimepath of adoption. In noncompetitiye. settings,
licensing and strategic interactions among agents alsoj:an affect the ^diffusipn of innovations (Reinganum,
1989). -Whereas in,most models pfdi^sion.the adoption of a superior technology eventually will be
.complete, in themodel;that we have outlined above it isactually^,possible that incomplete adoption of a
superior innovationmay attain, in equilibrium,becauseof the optimizing chpice of the innovator-
monopolist [for reasons similarto thosearticulated in Lapan andMpschini (1999)]. In the application that
fpjlows we will not attempt to model explicitly the diffusion process, but we >vill simply carry out our




The Model: Regional and.Parametric Specification
To analyze the welfare effects,of.the trading and,adoption ofRR soybeans„we need to choose an
appropriate spatial model, as well as to select parametric specification for the functional relationships that
are postulated.
Regional Specification . , i . •
To arrive ata,suitable regional,specification for our model, a.preliitiina^ look.at the geographical
distribution ofproduction and trade for soybeans and soybean products (the so-called "soybean complex")
is in order. Table 1reports data ofsoybean production and utilization for the most recent available year,
1997-98, It is apparent that soybeans are grown mostly in the Americas, which account for over 80% of
world soybean production. The main competition for the United States comes from South America,
where soybean production is concentrated in essentially two countries: Brazil and Argentina. The United
States is the single largest producer and the single largest exporter ofsoybeans, while the European Union
is the single largest importer. The dominance ofthe United States on the world market is perhaps
overstated in Table 1; a more accurate picture isobtained by accounting for the closely integrated soybean
oil and meal markets.
There aretwo basic uses forsoybeans. There is demand forsoybean whole seed to produce food
products, stock feed, and seeds (the "direct use" column in Table 1). But the most important use of
soybean is crushing, which results in the production ofsoybean oil and soybean meal in roughly fixed
proportions. Table 2reports data on production and utilization ofsoybean oil and soybean meal in 1997-
98. It is interesting to note that South America produces almost asmuch oil and meal as the United
States, and accounts for amuch larger share ofthe corresponding export markets. The European Union is
the largest importer of soybean meal, but it is actually a net exporter ofsoybean oil. China is the largest
importer ofsoybean oil, but the market for this product is geographically more dispersed than that of
soybeans and soybean meal.
Based on the evidence contained in Tables 1 and 2, we believe that we can adequately capture the
essence ofproduction and trade in the soybean complex with a three-region model. The regions that we
identify are: United States (US) (/' = f/), South America (SA) {i =S), and Rest ofthe World (ROW)
(/ = /?).
Parametric Specification
In addition to fitting the general innovation framework discussed earlier, the chosen parametric
specifications need to be flexible enough to account for the main features ofthe problem but simple
enough'to allow ease ofcalibration and solution. To begin with the parametric specification ofsupply, in
each country (and, for the time being, dropping the subscript i forvnotational'simplicity), profit per hectare
is written as:- > > . • r.
ji--dw ' standard technology"
.. / S
•• ' ' A+ a +'^<5vv(l+ f!i -RR.technology . i ,
1+ 77
where: rj =elasticity ofyield wi^ respect to soybean price; A,G =parameters subsuming all other
input prices (tHb Vector r), presumed corlstant; P = coefficient ofyield change-due to theRRtechnology;
a = coefficient of unit profit increase dueto the'RR'technology;and, /v-^markup on RR seedprice
(reflecting technology fee). It is useful to note thatthis formulation allows the newtechnology to affect
yield(through the parameter P)\ profitper hectare is affected through this paranieterand, separately,
through the parameter a . Note that the yieldfunctions are y = Gpg for the standardtechnology and
3^ = (1 + P)Gp\ for the RR technology.
• -J ^ ;rr- . ,j'r ' ,
For a given adoption rate /? e 0,1 , average profit per hectare is:
n A.+ pa rt- ^ - ^(1 +:/?//) '• vr . . i
1+ 7
such thatthe corresponding average yield is = (1 + pP)Gp\ • Supply of land to the soybean industry is
' ''' ' . I• . . .i .' 1 '• ' * 1","j; I• . ' It . . ' • -jx I :' " • . ' .'
written in constant-elasticity form as a function of average land rents, which depend on output price and
adoption rates, that is:
L^Xn^
where: d = elasticity of land supply with respect to soybean profit perhectare; and, X = scale
parameter._Hence, the aggregate supply of soj^beans, is,written as;
• - • w . ,T >
10
r,=A A+pa+^ '^^ ~Sw{\+pm)
1+ 77
(\ +p0)Apl
As illustratedearlier, the demand for soybeans is a deriveddemand that depends mostly on the
demand for soybeanmeal and soybeanoil. Following most existing oilseed models, we explicitly account
for the structureof the soybean complexby specifying separate demand ftinctions for the three "final"
uses identified earlier. If pQ and p^ denote the price of oil and the price of meal, respectively, then the
final demand functions for oil and meal are written as DqI^Pq) and . Additionally, the demand
for soybean whole seed (to produce food products, stock feed, and seeds) is written as D^i^pg). These
three demand functions are specified in constant elasticity form as:
^Oj(,Po,i) ~
^mXPm,^ ~^mjPmT
where Sj, is the (constant) demand elasticity for product j in region /.
Trade andMarket Equilibrium
Trade takes place at all levels of the soybean complex(i.e., for beans, oil, and meal). In addition, there
also is (potentially) trade in the new technology embedded in the RR soybean seeds. Competitive
equilibrium with three regions in the soybean complex will result in at most two trade flows for each
product. Assumingthat the United Statesand SouthAmericawill be net exporters for all three products at
all price levels of interest,^ the equilibrium conditions can be written in terms of US prices. We further
assume that unit transportation costs between regions are constant.^
4 This condition, of course, will be checked at the counterfactual equilibria computed below.
^ Here we do not attempt tomodel commercial policies with any detail. We may note, however, that
soybeans and soybean meal are essentially duty-free for most relevant importers (such as theEuropean
II
Suppose that crushing one unit ofisoybeans produces Yq units ofoil and y^ units ofmeal; and
that unit crushing costs in region / are constant and equal to ttij (the so-called criishing'margin). Then,
for given regional supply quantities VgJ of soybeans, and given changes ih'stocks ASjj for product j in
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l=U,S,Ri=U,S,R
Pb,U = roPo.U +rMPM.U
Pb,s ~ Pbju '^^b,s
Pm,s ~ Pm,U ^M.S
' ' J 1 • •i I ' ' i
Jt '!./
Po,s ~ Pojj ^o,s
-• r . '-I, I ' I ^
Pb.r ~ Pb.u,'^(b,r . , . ...
Pa/.R^ Pm,U-^/m,R , .:,J o, yp,_ J
, Po.R = Po,u ^0;R O i.;n.
where are the price differentials for product,J. jn region / .(relative to the United States) that reflect
(constant) transportation costs (as well as, possibly, equivalent specific tariffs of existing commercial
policies). *' •• '.Ir, • ' , • I
. ' ! C S • C' :: L- t
> ' •! ' I 1 " .
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Union and Japan), whereas soybean oil.is subject to import duties by most importers,(Meilke and
Swidinsky, 1998). For the purpose ofour model, the effect,ofpossible import policies isassumed to be
captured by the specified price differentials.,.- .u-un!.: - j.- .
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Calibration
Toevaluate thewelfare effects of theadoption ofRRsoybe^, both in theUnited States andabroad, the
parameters ofthe model are calibrated such that, atthe assumed value ofsome parameters discussed
below, the model predicts the prices and quantities ofsoybean and soybean products for the year 1997-98.
Quantity data are reported inTables 1and 2,and were discussed earlier. Table 3 reports available prices
in the soybean complex. The base prices for the model are the US farm price for soybeans ($ 230/MT in
1997-98) and theDecatur (US) price forsoybean meal and soybean oil (respectively $ 193/MT and $
571/MT in 1997-98). Comparison of f.o.b. prices inTable 3 suggests thatUSproducers enjoy a slight
cost advantage in shipping soybeans and soybean products to the relevant import markets. Based onthe
price differentials reported inTable 3 [corroborated by recent freight rates data (Williams, 1998)], we
estimate the following price differentials, which are held constant through the analysis: 5= —10,
/^5=-10, r^/j=30,and ^^^ = 60. The higher price differential for
soybean oil for theROW reflects higher import duties, which are common formany oil-importing
countries (Meilke andSwidinsky, 1998). The technical coefficients Tm ^o the average
world values as implied byTable 1(/o = 0.1808 and = 0.7942), and thebase value forthe crush
margin isthen estimated tobe rriy = 2652. These parameters will determine the vertical and spatial
configuration of prices, given US prices for soybeans and soybean products. ^
Acritical setofparameters to beselected concerns the modeling of the innovation at the
production level. Consider first the effects ofRR adoption on per-hectare costs and profit. There is
widespread agreement that the RR technology, at current input prices, decreases production costs for
farmers. Abenchmark is provided by Table 4, which reports estimated soybean production costs for 1999
for typical Iowa farm conditions. The cost budget for the standard technology is estimated by Iowa State
University Extension (Duffy and Vontalge, 1999). The cost budget for the RR technology represents our
estimate based on parameters provided by agronomists, as well as current market price conditions. From
13
' Table'4 it isapparent that RR soybeans provide better.retums per unit of land, even after accounting for
higher-seed prices.'Hie actual-cost reduction critically.depends ohwhether biie or over-]^e-top
Roundup freatments are carried out,>ranging from about $15,to $28jTiectare.6, Itturns out that,this
- estimated cost reduction r^ge isiessentially the sameas that reported inC^lson, Marra,^ andHubbell
• (1997). Based on that,,we conservatively assume an average costsa,ving of $20/hectare and thus put
•Att = 20 .T From^Table 4,.and otherproduction costibudgetS;for no tillage systems, we alsoestimate the
average per-hectare seed cost for standard soybean varieties for. theUnited States at,^ = 45 . The
current "technology fee" reported inTable4 implies that themarkup premium on RR soybean seeds is
jj = 0.43 Basedon these assumptions (andon otherparameters discussed below)we can calibrate the
• parameter a by using the difference in,per-hectareprofit betweenRR and; standard technology,which for
our specification implies:: .r^ - i , <• u : .
a =An-p ^
A somewhat more difficult task is to :calibrate the production parameters of the niodel for the
other regions, especially where RR soybeans are not yet grown. Beginning with the seed price markup, it
is widely accepted that IPR protection is weaker elsewhere in the world than in the United States. For
example,whereas the sale ofRR soybean seed to US farmers involves explicit and resfrictive contracts,
no such contracts are written for Argentine farmers. In fact, farmers cannot be legally forbidden to use
harvested seeds for next year's ownplanting inArgentina. Similarconsiderations will likely applyto
6 That is, from $6.08 to $11.54/acre.' • ' ' ' ' • ^ ^ •j
^Based on calculations provided by others, and informal communication with people in the industry, this
perhaps-is aconservative estimate ofthe average herbicide cost saving afforded.by the RR technology
(e.g., Rankin, 1999). • - •
^ In addition to the technology.fee.of $6.50 per.50 lb bag set by Monsanto; there seems,to be an' '
additional price premium for-RR seeds in the.current planting season (perhaps $l/bag).' But that effect is
ignored here. /. .• . ,
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other major foreign producing regions, such as Brazil and China. Thus it is unreasonable to expect the
innovator-monopolist to be able to apply the same markup pricing-in these regions. Based on such
considerations, we set the markup coefficient for South America atone-half the US value (i.e.,// = 0.22).
Given thatChina accounts forone-halfof theROW production, and that IPRprotection is likely more
problematic for this country than for South America, for the ROW we set the markup coefficient at one-
fourth theUS value (i.e., // = 0.11); 'We also note, based- onArgentine data (Margenes Agropectuarios,
1998), that farm prices for soybean seed tend to be somewhat lower overseas.^ Based on such
considerations, for both' South America andthe ROW we set ^ = 40.
Cost savings arealso somewhat more difficult to estimate outside theUnited States, where
growing conditions can differ substantially. Groves (1999) reports cost reductions in Argentina ashigh as
$25-30/hectare (presumably netof increased seed costs). A relevant consideration is thatthecost savings
ofthe RR technology are linked to herbicide use, and herbicide prices appear to be lower outside the
United States, among other things because ofweaker IPR protection. 10 Based on such considerations we
estimate the costsaving provided byRRtechnology to bethesame for both South America and ROW as
for the United States, and put A;r = 20 for these regions aswell. Given the assumed /J and A/f values,
the parameter a is calibrated as discussed earlier.
As for the effect ofRRtechnology onyield, current experimental evidence seems to suggest that
currently RR soybeans are somewhat less productive than standard soybean varieties (e.g., ISU Extension,
1998; OpHnger et al., 1998). But such experimental evidence should be carefully use in our context for at
least two reasons. First, the yield drag ofRR soybean is likely due to the particular way that the herbice
9Perhaps because ofthe particular marketing system used, whereby farmers buy first-generation seed
from licensed growers rather than buying the original seed from the seed company.
10 For example, most international patents for Roundup have expired, and generic glyphosate products
compete with Monsanto's Roundup elsewhere in the world, whereas Monsanto retains acompound patent
in the United States through the year 2000.
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resisterice trait is introduced into^commercial varieties. >Because this trait is essentially.additive, there
does not s^em to be any reason why theagronomic potential;of soybean varieties should suffer, at least in
the intermediate run (when thestrait has made,its way^intothe bestcommercial-varieties). Second, such
experimental tests ^e, inanytcase nieasuring anagronomic.potential that isnot necessarily relevant here.
Because RRsoybeans allow a better weed control technology, theRRtechnology may actually increase
yields inmany typical farming situations. Indeed, Monsanto claims thatRRvarieties outperformed .
standard varieties in the United States in-1997,and 1998 (Monsanto, 1999a), and estimates the ceteris
paribus yieldeffect of superiorweed,conttpl dueto Roundup at 2 bushels/acre (Monsanto, 1999b) (a gain
of roughly 5 percent). Our baseline calibration takes the conservative assumption of no yield effectand
sets = 0 inall regions. W^e will explore the imi)lication ofyield effects at the sensitivity analysis stage.
Assumptions on the elasticityof acreage supply andon^demarid elasticities for soybean and
soybean products are based on comparable.parameters in existing soybean and oilseed models (Table 5).
The picture that emerges from this cursory literature review suggests a consensus on inelastic supply of
soybeans, and even more inelastic demands^ But apart from that, there is really no consistent indication
that emerges from Table 5 as to regional or vertical (i.e., across products) differences in elasticities.
-I ' ' -i - II"' - .• : ' ;; 7" j ... - ! '
Given that, we set all demand elasticities for all products considered here to 0.4 (in absolute value). As
for supplyelasticities, we believe that the range represented inTable 5 underestimates,producers' ability
to switch between crops as profitability changes, especially in South America. Thqs, we let theelasticity
ofland supply with respect to soybean prices, defined as i// ~{dL/dpg)[pglVj, be 0.8 inthe United
States, 1.0 in South Xrnerica, and 0,6 in the ROW. Given that, the,parameter ^,is calibrated'as
-' ' - . I ' • . ' r *k. ' , ' •
6=y/ ^l\Pgy). Finally, because it seems widely accepted that the response of(optimal) yields to
' - '1- • -I,- • r- , •"> j ;i, •' '.j ] • . • , • •
changes in prices is limited, we set77 = 0.05 in ajlregions.. / ,
Given the assumed parameters justMiscussed,Jtheremaining'coefficients;4; 0; %,
and were calibrated so'as to retrieve acreage; quantity, yield, and price data for 1997-98 as reported
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in Tables 1-3.11 porthepurpose ofthis calibration step, the adoption rate used was theactual one
observed in the year 1997-98, as reported by James (1998) (i.e., /? = 0.13 for the United States, p = 0.2
for South America, and /?=0 for the ROW 12). Table 6summarizes the base values of the key
parameters used tocompute equilibria and welfare measures under various scenarios.
Results
The model detailed above was used to evaluate the welfare effects in the soybean complex arising from
the adoption ofRR soybeans. First ofall, for all counterfactual simulations we set A5'y= 0 for all
products and all regions (i.e., weassume that stock decisions arenot affected byRRadoption). Next, we
established the benchmark by solving the model with p =0 everywhere.1^ All counterfactual scenarios
then were evaluated relative to this benchmark. We computedthe change of producer surplus in each
region, as weli as the change in consumer surplus in each market in each region using standard procedures
(Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 1982).14 Specifically, let p^j represent the equilibrium price for product_/' in
region / in the benchmark scenario, and Pjj represent the equilibrium price for product^ in region i in a
particular adoption scenario. The corresponding change in consumer surplus iscomputed as:
AC5,, = D ,(v)rfv.
J
PjJ
11 To calibrate the parameter A we need an estimate ofthe profit per hectare in the base year. Based on
data reported in Table 4, as well as similar data for Argentina (Margenes Agropectuarios, 1998), we
estimated the "land rent" inthe base year to be 40% ofthe per-hectare revenue. Inany event, this
calibrated parameter isessentially an inconsequential scaling constant.
12 The latter is probably strictly not correct because China reportedly is planting some RR soybeans
(James, 1998), although data on the extent ofadoption are lacking.
13 All computations were carried out by using user-written programs coded in GAUSS.
14 Because we have assumed constant unit crushing costs, there is no rent in this model that accrues to
processors.
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where v is a dummy variable of integration. Similarly, if .L, (;r,-.)-denotesithe optimal allocation of land
to soybeans inregion i, thevariation inproducer surpilus (relative to the benchm^kwhere the unit;profit
is say) due tothe innovation (which leadito a unit profit-^/)'is: '
APS,=
. - . IThe monopolist's profit is computed simply as:
i=U,S,R
i.'-' ' t' ' "
c us lu a hil j 12
• 'JU '1' . . • • ^ . •
where, Z, is the total ^ountof land allocated to so>^be^ production in counti^ /when the adoption rate
is Pj andthe equilibrium soybean,priceJs ,Finally, the.total welfare change for the .United States is
defined as =y^.ACS/,; +APSy +11^, whereas for the other'two regions it is computed as
' Aff', =J^,ACSjj+APSlii =S,Jl).-
• ' • I • ' • I • ' ' f" j' .. I . • • '[ 1, • ;
Table 1 reports the results of our main simulations. First we look at the case in which the
. ' .1 .I ^ ' ' I'l .-O ' ' ' > I t ' • ' j"l . • ' • '
adoption rate is /7= 0^5 for theUnited States,/? = 0.32 for South Aiherica, knd /? = 0 in the ROW.
• , ' ' • ' *• I • 1 ;* T>• I • ,) • 'i '* 1' J
This IS, roughly, the scenario that is unfolding for the next crop year (1999-2000), during which RR
adoption in the United States is forecasted to be well above 50%, RR adoption inArgentina isexpected to
'" ' ' • . 1 '' • . I " < ''1"I ^ ' I'
be 100% (Groves, 1999), and Brazil might start producing RRsoybeans following a recent regulatory
' . . • . " r| . i' • . . i ' -t . ; -
approval.Under these conditions it emerges that the welfare change for consumers (relative to the
t I i , , • » j ,
' ' ' " •*' ' t ' I • • t i'
benchmark) is positive everywhere, whereas the welfare change forproducers is positive in the United
States and South America butnegative in the ROW. The innovator-monopolist's profits aresizeable and
account for 60% of the welfare gains accruing tothe home country, which itself captures the lion's share
ofthe woridwide benefits. For the scenario that is unfolding in the cr6p year 1999-2000, the woridwide
efficiency gain is estimated at about $804 million, 45% ofwhich is captured by the innovator-monopolist.
One ofthe questions that we posed earlier concerns the implications ofthe iritemkional spillover
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ofthe new technology from the home country to other regions that compete in the production ofthe final
product(s). In principle.such a spillover could have adverse effects for the home country's overall welfare
because it erodes thecompetitive position of theproducers of the final good (which is alsoexported). It
turns out that thewelfare of the United States (as a country) is slightly improved as RRtechnology is
exported. This conclusion can be evinced from Table 7by comparing the scenario
[pu =1,^5 =0,p^ =0} with the scenarios {p^ =\,ps =hpR =0} and {p^ =\,ps ='^ ,Pr =1} •
Thehome benefits come in the form of largerprofitfor the innovator-monopolist and increased consumer
surplus due to decline inprices. But the home country's export of thenew technology is particularly
taxing for domestic soybean producers, whose welfare isadversely affected by the export ofthe
innovation. In particular, moving from thescenario where only theUnited States adopts
=\,p^ = =0} to that ofworldwide adoption =l} >US producers lose
two thirds of theirwelfare gains. Under thescenario ofworldwide adoption =1,^5 = UPr = V
the innovator-rmonopolist profit constitutes 69 %ofthe US welfare gains. Conditional upon full adoption
in the United States, foreign adoption ofRR technology benefits the farmers of thecountry adopting the
new technology and the innovator (as well asconsumers everywhere). The last two columns ofTable 7
report the equilibrium soybean production and equilibrium soybean complex prices in the United States
under thevarious scenarios considered here (prices inother regions aredetermined bythe spatial
equilibrium conditions). These results give an idea ofthe market changes that underlie the welfare
measurement just discussed. For example, worldwide complete adoption ofRR soybean is estimated to
bring about, ceteris paribus, a0.6% increase in soybean production and a2.6% decrease in the price of
soybeans.
Another interesting question concerns the impact ofintellectual property rights, as modeled here,
on the ex-post distribution ofwelfare gains attributable to the innovation. To address this question, in
Table 8we report the estimated welfare effects for the main scenarios under consideration assuming that
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' (a) the new technology is competitively supplied (i.e.;.putting - 0, V/-), or (b) there is equal
intematiohal IPR protection (implemented here with equal seed price markups =0.43, Vi); First, by
comparing the overall welfare gains from Ae innovation in Tables 7^d 8we can establish ameasure of
the efficiency loss due to the exercise ofmarket power by the innovators. It is apparent that such a
welfare loss is extremely small. For example, in the scenario ofworldwide complete adoption, the
efficiency gains under competitive provision ofthe innovation are only 0.2% larger than those attained by
the assumed markup pricing. Tliis result is a reflection ofthe inelastic demand and supply fiinctions that
characterize the soybean complex, as well as tHe fact tKat, conditional bri'land allocated tosoybeans, the
demand for seed iscompletely inelastic. Also, the'observed markup pricing which is used inthe above
comparison is not necessarily the optimal monopolistic solution. More interesting, perhaps, is the
distribution ofthe welfare cliangesi In pMcular, itis clear that'the United States woiild be adversely
affected by the international spillover ofthenew technology were the latter to be' competitively supplied.
Comparing the scenario {p^ ~hPs -^^Pr =0} with the scenarios {/?„ = =1,/?/,'= 0} and
.Py = \,p^ = \,pn = l]- itemerges that US producers would gain considerably ifthe RR technology
were (freely) available only within the UnitedStates, but a good share of these gain would be lost as this
technology also is made available to their foreign competitors. More importantly, the gains that accrue to
domestic consumers as the RR technology is adopted abroad do not offset the parallel producer losses,
and the home country as a whole would be made worse off by overseas adoption of the new technology,
' • • r I •'} . • I'..
were the latter to be competitively supplied. This US welfare loss from foreign adoption of the superior
technology is due to the deteriorating terms of trade (export prices) for the United States.
' • ' I . . , '
' ' 3' J ' ' -J • • 'V. . .
The second part ofTable 8 looksat the welfare effects under the assumption that the RR seed
pricemarkup is the same everywhere (and reflecting the current level of the technology fee as applied in
theUnited States). Here, exportof the newtechnology wouldbe beneficial to the United States. Not
surprisingly, strengthened IPRs help the welfare ofthe innovating country. If a new technology such as
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RR soybeans is to be made available to competing countries, the market power due to IPRs allows the
innovating country to extract some ofthe efficiency gains that are generated by the new technology.
Again, however, producers in the home country are adversely affected by the technological spillover. But
strengthening international also has benefits for US producers (they lose less ifforeign producers are
required to pay the same markup oh improved seeds);
To investigate the robustness ofthe results discussed this far, we provide some sensitivity analysis
in Table 9. Because wehave already briefly discussed the effects ofaltering theprice markup inTable 8,
here we concentrate attention onthe following key parameters: demand elasticity, acreage supply
elasticity, and per-hectare profitability increase due to RR technology (the yield response parameter will
be considered later). For ease of interpretation here we limit the attention to thescenario ofworldwide
complete adoption. For comparison purposes we report the welfare effects associated with the base
values ofall parameters at the top ofTable 9. For each ofthe three sets ofparameters we illustrate the
welfare results associated with a ceteris paribus increase and decrease of the parameter values.
Doubling the value ofdemand elasticities would increase the computed welfare ofproducers and
decrease the gain to consumers (relative to the base-values scenario). Opposite effects would hold ifthe
demand elasticities arehalved. Doubling supply elasticities has aneffect onwelfare computations that is
opposite to that ofdoubling demand elasticities; in such aparametric situation one would find smaller gain
for soybean producers, and (slightly) larger gains for consumers. The sensitivity ofthe results to the
assumed supply shift is considered next. In the model this effect works through the parameter a, but for
clarity here we report it in tenns ofthe estimated per-hectare profit increase A;r (at given prices), from
which the parameter a is calibrated. As can be seen, increasing this parameter from 20 to 30 would
increase the gains to producers and (to alesser extent) to consumers. Opposite effects would hold if the
per-hectare profit increase ^7t were lowered to 10. The profit to the innovator-monopolist, on the other
hand, is extremely robust to all these alternative parametric assumptions.
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Theremaining sensitivity analysis thatwewishto investigate! iswith respect to the,parameter ,
which controls tlie'yield response to the adoption of the'RR technology. -As discussed earlier, there areno
compelling agronomic reasons'to expect'that the yield potential ofRR'soybeans should beaffected one
way oranother. Biitrealized yields; which- 'embody the econoihic decision of farmers, are a different
matter altojgether; Because the RR technology-seems tooffer a superior weed control mechanism, it is
quite possible thatRRadoption would results inyield increase because of diminished weed competition.
It turns out that the value of the 3 parameter is crucial to many of the results outlined earlier. Thus,
rather than confining theeffecU ofthisparameter to the narrow bounds ofTable 9,wereport inTable 10
themore complete analysis ofTabje ,7, butjWith theassump p = 0.05 [i.e., a 5%yieldgain due to RR
technology, asclaimed by Monsanto; (1999b)] replacing the assumption = 0. ^^
It is apparent that this yield parameter is crucial in deteimining the benefits to producers. The
scenario of ^ = 0.05 generates large welfare losses for producers.for almost every scenario. In
particular; US producers are negatively affected bythe adoption' of the new;technology (the exception is
when adoption only takes place'ih%e United States);' These massive-welfare'losses for the producers are
due to the price decline that is associatedwith-the supply shift'due tb the yield effect. It is worth.noting
that the market adjustments required to bring about these welfare effects are not out of the ordinary, as can
begathered from the lasttwocolumns ofTable 10. Forexample, worldwide complete adoption.ofRR
soybean for the'case 0.05 isestiniateii tobring'about, ceterisparibus, a 2.1%'increase in-soybean
production and a 6.1% decrease in the price'of soybeans. On the other hand, the assumption ofa5% yield
increase considered here woiild resulVih increased welfai"e'jgains for consumers,'which essentially offset
the welfare losses to producers. Overall,'therefere; the welfare gain's attributable to RR technology
• . 1'
We should make:it explicit that the cetetiisparibi^ condition here means^that the.parameter A;r is
held constant, whereas the parameter a is re-calibrated with the new value of/3. This explains why, for
example, the overall world welfare gains associated with = 0 are larger than those for theicase of
J3=0.05.
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adoption are not affected by alternative assumptions about yield response, but the disfribution ofthese
welfare gains between consumers and producers, and across regions, is quite sensitive to yield response
assumptions. What is also robust, once again, are the returns to the innovator-monopolist. This is
because adoption rates and price markup are held constant in all scenarios, so that monopoly profit only
changes as land allocated to soybean is varied. Comparing the scenario {py =l,/?^ =0,/?^ =O} with
the scenarios {p^j =l.Ps =^,Pr =O} and'{py =\.Ps =IPr =l}. it emerges that the negative impact
on US welfare ofexporting the RR technology are amplified in the presence ofa positive yield response.
As before, US producers are p^icularly hurt by the export ofthe US technology, and total US welfare
actually falls as the innovation isadopted elsewhere in the world!
In conclusion, the sensitivity analysis illustrated in Tables 9 and 10 suggests thatmost of the
qualitative results discussed here are fairly robust to alternative assumptions concerning some key
parameters. The one exception is the conclusion that RR adoption always benefits producers.
Specifically, that conclusion is reversed if, ceteris paribus, one were to assume that RR technology does
in fact lead to increased soybean yields realized by farmers. Because this parameter is crucial to some of
the qualitative conclusions that we obtain here, additional evidence on this score would be desirable.
Caveats and Conclusions
The results that we have discussed above are obviously subject toa number ofqualifications. On the one
hand, the.model is highly aggregated (the world is represented by only three regions and there is no
heterogeneity allowed within agiven region), and the parameterization of the model is very parsimonious.
On the other hand, even within this specialized model, there are ,a number ofcritical parameters whose
calibration is difficult, given available information. Hence, the analysis,ofthis paper can only hope to
provide approximate answers to the problems of interest. The reader is well advised to concentrate
attention on the direction ofchange and on the order ofmagnitude ofthe welfare effects that are
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ertimated, rather th^ putting too much stock inthe actual numerical results! Sensitivity analysis can help
•' somewhat inassessing the confidence one c^ put inoi^results, and the reader with strong different
priorson somekey parameters may find'that section useful. " '
Conditional' on the validity of the parametric'specification and calibration chosen, our.welfare
•analysis is still incomplete for several reasons.- First, ourmodel does not explicitly account for the .
possible adjustment in other prices in the demand and supplyfunctions. Thus, our measurements are
'' strictly "partial'equilibrium" ones.- Second, the computation of themonopolist's profit does notaccount
for an additional source ofprofit for-the innovator: the sale'of'Roundup herbicide. -Withoutmore
' 'information on the herbicide market,'it is difficult to account in a satisfactory way for this effect. But we
=suspect that in the'intermediate-run this omissionmay not be too relevant, because compietition from
generic glyphosate products may constrainMonsanto's ability to capture rents in the herbicide market.
' Finallyj'we do not attempt to quantify the alleged envirohmental.benefits-that accrue because^adoption of
RR'soybeaii induces a substitution of herbicide use towards glyphosate and away froni more .
' ' environmentally damaging ones; ' • .-i . ... .•••'. .. -.c.] ,i..' . .
•• •- • Turning now to bur main findings, the base scenario suggests-that the overall efficiency gains due
to RR adoption are quite sizeable. Nofsurprisirigly for an innovation-that is patented^ a good share of
theseefficiency gains^e captured by<the innovator." Butconsumers also benefit (because of reduced
pricesfor soybean and soybean products). '^At the observed'pricing of the.RJl innovation,.the welfare of
producers in theadopting regions is positively affected. ButUSproducers are hurtby the export ofthe
new technology perse, because such international innovation spillover hampers theircompetitive
position. The sensitivity analysis carried out highlights that some ofour conclusions are critically
dependent on the assumption that the innovation does not affect soybean yields. When such an
assumption is replaced bythe alternative that RR adoption does increase farmers' yields, we find that
farmers are negatively affected by the innovation. In such ascenario, competitive farmers really have no
choice but to adopt the cost-reducing innovation. At given prices this new technology induces a larger
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allocation of land to soybean production and an increased supply of soybeans. Thesupply shift tends to
depress prices in the soybean complex, and the drop in prices here isamplified by inelastic demands for
soybeans and soybean products. Inequilibrium, farmers employ a superior technology but face lower
.soybean prices and, given the parameters ofour model, land allocated to soybean production is reduced
and producers' welfare alsois reduced. The results of thisyield increase scenario mayalsogivea clue on
the possible qualitative welfare effects tobeexpected byother biotechnology innovations aimed at
increasing pest and stress resistance, forwhich an yield increase effect iswidely documented (aswith Bt
com, for example). Suchproprietary yield increasing innovations are likelyto be damaging to thewelfare
position of farmers, although theyareequally likely to result in large efficiency gains for society.at large.
Related issues concern the role of IPRs and the worldwide marketing of the innovation on the
welfare of USproducers andofthe.United States at large. Conditional upon international spillover of the
technology taking place, as onemay expect fora superior innovation suchas RRsoybeans, it is fortunate
for the United States that this innovation is marketed by a private firm who, through pricing of a
proprietary technology, can capture some ofthe efficiency gains due toRR technology. But these effects
are limited bytheextent of IPRprotection. Weak IPRs overseas mean that the innovating firm cannot
recoveras much return from that market segment.' In fact, insofar as the discoverer is endowedwith
substantially more market power at home than abroad, the ensuing pricing ofthe innovation ends up
discriminating against domestic soybean producers (relative to foreign soybean producers).
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Table 1. Soybean Production and Utilization, 1997-98







World 69.3 2.26 156.6 NA 1.9 22.1 132.4
United States 28.0 2.62 73.2. 23.6 1.8 . 4.3 43.5
South America 22.0 2.50 55.0 12.2 0.1 2.9 - 39.8




Brazil 13.0 2.42 31.5 8.0 0.1 1.9 21.5
Paraguay 1.2 2.49 3.0 2.4 -0.0 0.1 0.5
Rest of the World 19.3 1.47 28.4 -35.8 0 14.9 49.1
European Union 0.5 3.44 1.6 -16.1 -0.0 1.4 16.3
China 8.4 1.76 14.7 -2.8 0.0 6.8 10.7
Japan 0.1 1.75 0.1 -4.9 0.0 1.3 3.7
Mexico 0.1 1.47 0.2 -3.2
1
0.1 3.3
Source: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service.
Note: Area is inmillions of hectares, yield is inmetric tons perhectare, and all total quantities are in
millions ofmetric tons.
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Table 2. Soybean Oil and Meal, Production and Utilization, 1997-98
[millions of metric tons (MT)]
Production "• Net export A in Stocks Consumption
World - ^ 23.94 . ,NA 0.09
23.85
'7 * •






South America ' ' 7.19 . "3.44 0;08
" 3.67
Argentina 2.87 - - 2.70 -0.07 0.1
Brazil " " 4.00- - . -0.00 2.79
—
,
Rest of the World 8.52; - - -4.84 0.07 13.-29
European Union 2.94, - - 1.09 0.00 . 1.85
China 1.78 • -1.63 >, . 0.13 3.28
Mid East/N Africa , '0.26. : ~ ,'-1.58 - - 0.00 1.84
-
Production Net export A in Stocks Consumption
World 105.15 NA - 0.14 105.01
i '
-
United States 34.63 8.41" 0,00 26.22
-
•
South America . 31.82 22.53 0.49 8.8
Argentina 13.53 12.90 , . .0.01 0-62
Brazil 16.94 10.65 . 0.29, 6
* f
Rest of the World 38.70 r , ;-30,94.,, ; . ^-0^35 69.99
European Union 12.74 -12.02 -0.02 24.78
China 8.58 -4.19 0.00 12.77
Mid East/N Africa 1.11 -3.67 -0.03 4.81
Source: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service.
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Table 3. Prices in the Soybean Complex (US S/MT)
93-94 a 94-95 a 95-96 a 96-97 a 97-98 a Avg
SOYBEANS
US farm price ^ 233 205 263 274 230 241
US Gulf, f.o.b. t) 248 226 288 293 247 260
Argentina f.o.b. ^ 231 214 277 288 231 248
Brazil f.o.b. b 235 217 284 285 240 252
Rotterdam c.i.f. ^ 259 248 304 307 258 275
SOYBEAN MEAL -
US (Decatur), 44% 199 167 248 286 193 219
Brazil, 44-45%, f.o.b. b,d 182 172 256 289 201 220
Argentina (pell.) f.o.b. ^ 174 151 233 257 174 198
Rotterdam c.i.f.
(Argentine 44-45%)
202 184 256 278 197 223
Rotterdam c.i.f.
(Brazil 48%) c,d
211 194 266 293 212 235
'
SOYBEAN OIL
US (Decatur) ^ 596 605 550 504 571 565
US Gulf, f.o.b. c 643 569 527 622 590
Brazil, f.o.b. ^ . 546 629 540 518 618 570
Argentine, f.o.b. ^ 545 625 540 517 617 569
Rotterdam, f.o.b. ^ 580 642 575 536 633 593
Notes: (a) Fiscal years (October to September).
(b) Source;'USDA.
(c) Source: Oil World.
(d) Percentage refers to protein content.
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Table 4. Production Costs for Soybeans in Iowa, 1999




Standard ^ Roundup Ready ^
Fixed •Variable Fixed,' Variable
Pre-harvest machinery 14.03 :.5.70 " ' 14.03 • 5.70
' *- • 1 ' : - • . ;
Seed^i r i 18.00 * p 18.00









intermediate inputs ' '
36.95








• ' - " 1; : . 'j' f i. • ' f
Harvest machinery ' • 13.57 5.95 13.57 5.95
•
. '• "
Labor ' 15.75 'r 15.75-












- '.,1^ • • j, •' < '11.54 t
[6.08] g
Notes: (a) Based on yield of45 bu/acre.
(b) Source: Duffy and Vontalge (1999).
(c) Source: Our adaptation of ISU extension budgets.
(d) 1.2 bags/acre.
(e) $ 6.50/bag.
(0 Based on one over-the-top Roundup treatment (32 oz/acre of Roundup Ultra and 3 lbs/acre of
ammonium sulphate) (note: here we do not adjust labor and pre-harvest machinery costs to
reflect the saving of one herbicide pass).
(g) Based on two over-the-topRoundup treatments (48 oz/acre of Roundup Ultra and 5 lbs/acre
of ammonium sulphate).
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Table 5. Elasticities Commonly Used for the Soybean Complex
Supply (Area) Oil Demand Meal Demand
elasticity elasticity Elasticity
0.22 a -0.08 a -0.11 a
United States 0.60 b -0.37 b -0.31 b
0.30 c -0.10 c -0.12 c
-0.30 d -0.12 "d
Argentina 0.25 d -0.30 ^ -1.31^1 ..
0.44 a -0.06 a -0.05 a
Brazil 0.55 d -0.10 b -0.25 d
' -0.30 d
0.35 b -0.40 t" -0.40 b
Canada 0.31 c -0.10 c -0.36 c
-0.35 d -0.37 d
China 0.28^1 -0.20 ^ -0.25 d
0.22 a -0.04 a -0.07 a
European Union / 0.40 b -0.40 b -0.37 b
European Community 0.84 c -0.10 c -0.25 c
-0.50 d -0.25 d - '
0.65 b -0.04 a -0.06 a
Japan 0.07 c -0.47 b -0.35 b
-0.10 c -0.20 c
-0.20 d - -0.20 d
Sources: (a) FAPRl model,Meyers,Devadoss andHelmar (1991);
(b) SWOPSIMmodel, Roningen and Dixit (1989);
(c)'AGLINK model, from Meilke and Jay(1997);
(d) AGCANADA model, Meilke and Swidinsky (1998)
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Table 6. Base Values ofKey Parameters
United States South America
1.' '
ROW T ' •
1' 1 ' ^
Supply (Area)
elasticity (^) 0.8 : 0 ,1.0 - - 0.6 . -









yield (77) " ,
• ' r- r. '
0.05- Vo.05 0;05 -
RR yield change '
coefficient (/^) '0
' i
0 - - .
* r **•
0 - ' - ^-
Beari demand ,.• :





Oil Demand, ^ r
elasticity (-^0) -0.4 - -0.4 - -- -0.4
Meal Demand
Elasticity " • -0.4 --0.4 •-0.4 '
Unit seed cost 1
$/hectare (Sw) 45 ' ' - 40 , • 40
RR seed price
markup (/^) .0.43









for oil (Iq) " -10 60
Price differential
for meal " -10 30
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US 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 V,. 72.4- p,=228
SA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 '54.1 Po = 565
ROW • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I- i 28;r P«=192
- ' .
US 0.55 9 31 42 81 156 358 596 73.0 Pb = 226
SA 0.32 6 17 14 36 27 64 Pq = 560
ROW 0 31 60 111 201 .58 144 27.9 • P«=191
.
US 1 10 35 47 91 391 546 1028 : ;^-73.8- • p, = 226
SA 0 7 19 16 41 -124 -83 53.5" Po = 560
ROW 0 35 67 124 226 -65 161 • :27.9 ^^^=190
'
US . 1 21 71 96 187 213 735 1136 •.-'73.-1^ .P. =223
SA 1 14 38 32 84 178 262 ;:54.9:
ROW 0 71 137 255 463 -132 331 27.7 P„ = 188
'
•
US 1 25 87 117 230 135 819 1183 72.8 Pb = 222
SA 1 17 47 39 103 120 223 54.6 p„=552
ROW 1 87 168 312 568 224 791 28.5 ;'„ = 188
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Table 8. Welfare Effects of RR Technology in the-Soybean.Complex under Alternative Market
Structures for the Provision of the Innovation
(millions ofUS $)












US • 1 19 67 90 " 177 782 o . 958
SA 0 13 *36 30 79 - -239 , -160
ROW 0 67 130 - 240 - - ,437 -125 312
- •
-
US 1 35 " 121 "162 317 . 519 o 836
SA 1 .23 64 • 54 142 194 '• 335
ROW 0 120 232 ^ 431 783 . .-222 561
-
US 1 40 141 188 369 422 0 791
SA 1 27 75 63 165 121 287
ROW 1 140 271- ; •'. 502 913 .. 210 1123













' , : •
US 1 10 35 47 91 , 391 546 1028
SA - 0- -7 19 .. .. 16 41- , , -.124 -83
ROW 0 35 67 124 226 -65 . 161
US 1 16 56 75 147 ' 286 918 1352
SA • 1 11 30 25 66 • -50 116




US 1 18 62 83 163 258 1248 1668
SA 1 12 33 28 73 28 101
ROW ] 62 119 222 403 23 426
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Table 9. Sensitivity Analysis: Sdected Parameter Values
Welfare Effects (millions of US S, case of complete worldwide adoption)
Parameters Region ACS A?5 nw AW
•• , .
Base values
US 230 135 819 1183
SA 103 120 • 223
ROW 568 224 791
' _ ' • . •
Demand elasticities:
Base values x1/2
US 266 67 815 1148
SA 69 188
ROW ... 658 197 855
Demand elasticities:
Base values x2
US 180 228 823 1232
SA 81 190 271
ROW 445 260 705
Supply elasticities:
Base values x1/2
US 175 236 819 1230
SA 78 196 275
ROW 433 262 695
Supply elasticities:
Base values x2
US 212 56 818 1146
SA 122 61 • 183




US 115 67 815 997
SA 52 59 111





US 344 206 822 1371
SA 154 183 336
ROW 849 338 1188
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Table 10. Sensitivity Analysis: Yield Increase Scenario (y9 = 0.05 )


















US 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ^2,3^ p,=229
SA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 " ;:53.9. p„=561
ROW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28.2 Pm=193
US 0.55 23 81 108 212 -93 355 474 73.9 :.;'b=224
SA 0.32 16 43 36 95 -154 -59 5410. Po=556
ROW 0 80 155 288 524 -150 374 . • 27;8-. Pm=189
•'i
US 1 28 98 132 258 59 540 858 .. .76.0 • Pb=223
SA 0 19 52 44 116 -346 -230 ' / :52;1' • Po=553
ROW 0 98 189 351 638 -182 456 -21.1
US 1 51 177 237 464 -328 718 853 74,5 p,=2lS
SA 1 34 94 79 208 -224 -16 55.3: Po = 542
ROW 0 176 340 631 1147 -324 823 27.3
US 1 62 214 287 564 -512 795 846 73.7 p,=2\5
SA 1 42 114 97 252 -360 -108 54.6 Po= 537
ROW 214 413 766 1393 -33 1359 29.4 P« = 182
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